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We present a bi-dimensional multi lottery choice task which can be used in order 
to elicit the agents’ risk attitudes in financial environments. This task is implemented 
both with hypothetical and real monetary incentives in a between-subjects and a within-
subjects experiment. We observe choices involving significantly lower risk aversion on 
aggregate when incentives are real. The differences grow with the stakes at play. We 
also obtain significant differences between hypothetical and real rewards in both utility 
weighting and probability weighting estimated parameters. We find that the use of 
hypothetical incentives in multi-lottery choice tasks for evaluating individual risk 




Presentamos una lotería múltiple bidimensional que puede utilizarse para elicitar 
la actitud frente al riesgo en entornos financieros. Esta tarea fue implementada en dos 
tratamientos: entre e intra-sujetos, tanto bajo incentivos monetarios hipotéticos como 
reales. Observamos que los sujetos son significativamente menos adversos al riesgo 
cuando los incentivos que se les ofrecen son reales. Estas diferencias aumentan con la 
cuantía de los pagos en juego. También obtenemos diferencias significativas entre 
incentivos hipotéticos y reales en los parámetros estimados de ponderación de la 
utilidad y de ponderación de la probabilidad. El uso de incentivos hipotéticos para la 
evaluación de los niveles individuales de aversión al riesgo puede llevar a resultados 
engañosos. 
 
Keywords: experimental economics, hypothetical bias, multi-lottery choice task. 










In a recent survey, Harrison and Rutström (2008) affirm that reliable laboratory 
methods exist to determine the individual risk aversion of a subject and that these 
methods could be systematically employed to ensure greater control over tests and 
applications of theory that depend on risk attitudes. They clearly advocate in favor of 
saliently motivating subjects’ responses. We want to investigate at the individual level 
the consequences of not doing it. A broadly used test among psychologists is 
Zuckerman’s (1978) Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS), while economists mainly use the 
Holt and Laury (2002) type of binary lotteries (HL). The SSS asks about different types 
of risks, including financial risks, while HL is exclusively framed in the monetary 
domain. Both tests present the problem of uni-dimensionality of the risk aversion 
characterization of an individual. The Sabater-Grande and Georgantzís (2002) test 
(SGG) that we use allows us to obtain two parameters of the utility function in an 
efficient way. 
 
The role of incentives in the context of individual decision making under risk and 
uncertainty has been recurrently explored in the literature. Since Edwards (1953) found, 
as we do, an increase in the willingness to take risks when participants play for real 
money, there have probably been more studies comparing “hypothetical” with “real” 
decisions in this context than in any other area of experimental economics. However, 
the issue is still far from settled and many articles are published still today using either 
method. Our aim in this study is to analyze the existence, direction, and practical 
relevance of the difference between risk aversion levels inferred under hypothetical and 
real incentives. 
 
The general consensus among psychologists seems to be that hypothetical risky choices 
give a reasonable, qualitatively correct picture of real choices. Wärneryd (1996) 
supports their use in survey contexts. Wiseman and Levin (1996) carry out three 
experiments in which subjects make risky decisions under conditions of hypothetical or 
real consequences, finding no significant differences in any of them. Beattie and 
Loomes (1997) suggest that in simple pairwise choices, incentives appear to make very 
little difference with regard to performance. Also many economists, maybe influenced 
by the psychologists’ experimental tradition as suggested by Harrison and Rutström 
(2008), do not always motivate the subjects monetarily when asking about their risk 
preferences. For instance, Kuhberger et al. (2002) find that the change from small 
incentives (hypothetical payoffs, real low payoffs) to high incentives (real high payoffs) 
leads to a difference in choices, but on the other hand, the same choices are made with 
real high payoffs than with hypothetical high payoffs. Dohmen et al. (2005) find that 
the answers to a general risk attitude question predict actual behavior in a lottery quite 
well. Also Faff et al. (2008) find no significant differences between using hypothetical 
or real payoffs when comparing financial risk tolerance with risk aversion. 
 
However, the standard experimental economics methodology (Smith, 1982) advocates 
for salient economic rewards when designing an experiment and many studies report 
different results with hypothetical and real incentives. It is assumed that if subjects do 
not consider hypothetical gains seriously, they may be tempted to take more risks (or be 
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less risk averse) than when they are really likely to win. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) 
review 74 studies comparing behavior of experimental subjects who were not paid, or 
were paid low or high financial incentives according to their performance. They 
conclude, contrary to us, that when incentives are low, subjects declare that they would 
be more risk-loving than they actually are when incentives are increased. Also Etchart-
Vincent and l’Haridon (2008) find that subjects exhibit more risk seeking when choices 
are hypothetical than real. 
 
Holt and Laury (2002, 2005, 2008) find that increasing the size of real payoffs leads 
subjects to behave in a more risk averse manner both in the gain and the loss domain, 
while with hypothetical payments, more than half of the subjects who are risk averse for 
gains turn out to be risk seeking for losses. 
 
Our results are in line with the studies in the literature which claim a difference between 
hypothetical and real payments. However, in contrast with most previous studies, we 
observe choices which are, on average, less risk averse when payments are real. 
 
A within-subject design is more reliable than a between-subject design but it presents 
the potential bias of a carryover effect across sessions, which is very difficult to control 
even taking into account order effects, since, once the subject has been incentivized to 
think seriously about his risk preference, he will probably remember and try to be 
consistent with his decision even if asked again hypothetically. So we opted for using a 
between subjects and a within subjects design and cross-check in this way for the 
robustness of our results, with the advantage of having relatively many data available 
under both conditions from the experiments that we have carried out. In fact, a total of 
786 subjects participated in our lotteries and 402 of them received real rewards for their 
decisions. No other study comparing hypothetical with real incentives in risk aversion 
elicitation has a comparable sample size. 
 
Our results clearly advocate in favor of saliently motivating the answers of the risk-
aversion test and the elicited level of risk aversion significantly decreases with respect 
to the case of no payment. 
 
In the next section we explain in detail the experimental design. Then, in Section 3, we 
present the results. Conclusions and references follow. 
 
 
2- EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
We organized two treatments. In the between subjects treatment (BST) our subjects 
were a relatively large sample of 695 subjects who were volunteers recruited among the 
undergraduate students of Business Administration from University Jaume I in Spain. 
From them, 384 subjects received no money for the lottery decision task and 311 
subjects faced the real monetary consequences of the lottery that they had chosen.  
 
In the within subjects treatment (WST) 91 Business Administration students also 
voluntarily recruited from the same university, who did not participate in the previous 
treatment, were presented the same lottery decisions as in the BST but they had to face 
both conditions: first by taking hypothetical decisions and, about one year later, 
repeating the test under real payment for the lotteries. The temporal stability of 
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estimates of risk aversion has been studied in detail by Harrison et al. (2005) and 
Andersen et al. (2008). Their results show evidence of stability for appropriately built 
risk aversion measures for periods up to one and a half year, if the personal 
socioeconomic conditions of the subjects are not importantly changed. Baucells and 
Villasís (2010) find some evidence of individual changes in a three month period, but 
they did not pay their subjects, which as we show in the present article, can lead per se 
to inconsistent decisions. 
 
Apart from comparing with the between-subjects design in order to check for 
consistency, in the within-subjects treatment we also introduced a long time span in 
order to minimize possible carryover effects in the latter treatment. Average earnings in 
the case of real payments were 6€, the lotteries were explained and completed in about 
10 minutes. 
 
The experiments in which the lotteries were played involved no show up fee and no 
randomized payment. Therefore, our results are not very dependent on the possible 
sample selection biases pointed out by Harrison et al. (2009), particularly for the within 
subjects treatment, where the distribution of subjects’ risk aversion levels is exactly the 
same. 
 
Rather than usual tests based on binary choice tasks à la Holt and Laury, subjects were 
presented with the multi-lottery choice task, SGG, which is more appropriate for our 
purposes, due to the variety of results it produces1. The task is designed to capture 
efficiently two dimensions of a subject’s preferences towards risky choice. i) First, it 
distinguishes between risk neutral or loving subjects and subjects with different degrees 
of risk aversion as other lotteries do. ii) Second, the test explores the subjects’ reaction 
to an increase in the magnitude of the risk compensation, that is, an increase in the 
stakes at play. In fact, by asking our subjects to take four decisions, we get four points 
of their utility function depending on the size of the compensation for risk, while the 
most widely used method gets one point after having asked multiple, normally ten, 
choices.  
 
As shown in Table 1, the SGG task involves four panels of ten lotteries each. Each 
lottery 𝑗 = 1, … ,10 entails a chance 𝑝𝑗 of earning €X  (else nothing). Each participant 
in our experiment had to choose one of the ten lotteries for each of the four panels, 
presented simultaneously to them. 
 
After choices were collected, a four-sided die determined the panel which would be paid 
in the case of real payments. Subjects choosing the certain payoff in the selected panel 
were paid €1 . Subsequently, a 10-sided die was thrown to determine the “winning-
lottery threshold”. If the result of casting the die was 0, no payment was made to those 
having chosen a probabilistic payoff, if the result was any other number between 1 and 
9, those subjects having chosen a loss probability lower or equal than that number 
divided by 10 got the prize corresponding to the probability chosen, the others got 0. 
Each one of the 4 panels is constructed using a certain payoff, 𝑐 = 1€, and the expected 
earnings, 𝑝𝑗𝑋𝑗, are increased by a ratio 𝑡 times the probability of not winning, 1 − 𝑝, as 
implied by the formula: 𝑝𝑗𝑋𝑗 = 𝑐 + 𝑡(1 − 𝑝𝑗). That is, an increase in the probability of 
the unfavorable outcome is linearly compensated by an increase in the expected payoff. 
 
1 See García-Gallego et al. (2011) for details. 
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We use four different risk premium parameters in the four panels, 𝑡 = 0.1, 1, 5, and 10, 
implying an increase in the return of risky choices as we move from one panel to the 
next. 
 
In order to study the subjects’ reaction to an increase in 𝑡, that is, the magnitude of the 
risk compensation, we define the elasticity of the probability chosen in panel 𝑖 = 2, 3, 







                   [1] 






 as the elasticity of the probability chosen in panel 
1 to the maximum increase in risk compensation, occurring in panel 42.  
 






, where j=1, 2, …10, it can be checked that a subject maximizing the 





 would choose the lottery j  with the 
probability closest to ?̂? = 𝛼(1 + 𝑐/𝑡). 
 
On the one hand this confirms the intuitively expected outcome that the lower the 
probability of winning that the subject chooses, the less risk averse he is, whereas risk 
neutral/loving subjects would choose 𝑝𝑗 = 0.1  in all panels. On the other hand, it 
predicts that the subject should choose riskier lotteries as we move from panel 1 to 
panel 4. Thus, for risk-averse expected utility maximizing subjects, their sensitivity to 
the attraction implied by a higher risk compensation 𝑡  can be approximated by the 
difference in their choices across subsequent panels.  
 
Our multi-lottery approach also allows us to estimate maximum likelihood models of 
utility functions in a similar way to Harrison and Ruström (2009). However, we have to 
adapt a structural model of binary choice to more than two categories, given that in 
SGG test we have ten possible choices.  
 
First, we estimate a CRRA utility function using SGG lotteries data and assuming 






+ 𝜀𝑛𝑗                 [2] 
 
Where, 𝑋𝑗 is the prize of lottery 𝑗,  αn is the utility weighting parameter and  εnj is the 
stochastic error, with expected value 𝐸(𝜀𝑛𝑗) = 0 ∀𝑛, 𝑗.  
 
Under EUT, the value associated with 𝑋𝑗 satisfies: 
 
 
2 The elasticities obtained from our data are shown in Table 3 and analyzed in the Results section. 
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The probability of a subject 𝑛 selecting lottery 𝑗 over all other possible lotteries is: 
 
𝑝(𝑗) = 𝑝(𝐸𝑈𝑛𝑗 > 𝐸𝑈𝑛𝑘) ∀𝑘 ≠ 𝑗            [4]  
 





                                    [5] 
 
For instance, the log likelihood of the multinomial logit model is:  








                 [6]  
 
Where 𝑧𝑛𝑗 = 1 if individual 𝑛 chooses lottery 𝑗, 𝑧𝑛𝑗 = 0 otherwise. 
 
Second, we estimate maximum likelihood models of utility functions assuming Rank 
Dependent Utility Theory (RDUT). We consider the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
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where 𝛾𝑛 is the probability weighting parameter, that is, each subject can interpret the 
same probability in a personal way. 
 
Under RDUT, the value associated with a lottery 𝑋𝑗 satisfies: 
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We estimate again equation [6] using now equation [8], thus obtaining both the utility 




In table 2 we present descriptive statistics of the choices made by panel, treatment and 
reward method (hypothetical, N=384; real money, N=311). Additionally, in Figure 1 
and Figure 2 we present histograms of subjects’ probability choices by panel and reward 




The median in the real reward panels is around 0.4 while it is 0.5 in the hypothetically 
paid panels and this difference is always significant using Mann Whitney tests in the 
BST and Wilcoxon tests in the WST. Specifically, we observe in Table 4 that with real 
rewards, the probability chosen by subjects is significantly lower than the probability 
chosen with hypothetical rewards in both treatments, with the exception of panel 4 in 
the WST. 
 
Result 1: We observe that in both the between and the within-subjects treatments our 
subjects choose on average riskier lotteries in the SGG test when given real payments 
as compared to hypothetical ones. 
 
Additionally, using a Levene test we find, as we can see in Table 5, that in the between-
subjects treatment the variance of the probabilities chosen by subjects in any panel is 
significantly higher with hypothetical payments than with real ones. In contrast, in the 
within-subjects treatment, we obtain this finding for panel 4 only. 
 
Result 2: We find that in the SGG multiple lottery task real rewards generate more 
concentrated choices than hypothetical rewards.  
 
Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (see Table 6) we obtain that hypothetical and real 
rewards generate significantly different distributions of observations3. From Figures 1 
and 2 we can observe that with real payments the distribution generally shifts to the left, 
implying lower levels of risk aversion, and kurtosis grows, reflecting lower variance in 
the decisions. 
 
Comparing the elasticities of choices with hypothetical and real payments using a 
Mann-Whitney test (see Table 4), we obtain that, in the BST, subjects’ reaction to an 
increase in risk compensation is larger when rewards are real than hypothetical, with the 
exception of e4. In the WST this effect is confirmed only for emaxp, t. 
 
Result 3: In the BST the change in subjects’ chosen probability from panel to panel is 
relatively greater when payments are real than when they are hypothetical. In the WST 
only the change between the first and the last panel is significant. 
 
Apart from calculating the elasticity we have estimated the multinomial logit models 
presented in Section 2, both under EUT and RDUT and for our two different treatments: 
real vs. hypothetical payment. We estimate them by maximum likelihood using the 
clustering method that allows for the possibility of correlation between responses by the 
same subject: the standard errors of the estimates are corrected for the possibility that 
the four responses are clustered for the same subject. 
 
Estimation results are reported in Table 7. Under EUT, the results for the WST and BST 
are analogous. In the WST the average of the CRRA parameter estimate 𝛼 is 0.600 with 
real payment and 0.638 with hypothetical payment. This difference is significant, 
confirming again our Result 1 that subjects are more risk averse when payments are 
hypothetical. The results are equivalent for the BST: 𝛼 is 0.621 with real payment and 
0.665 with hypothetical payment, and this difference is also significant. These values 
are in accordance to those obtained by Harrison et al. (2009). 
 




Under RDUT, the CRRA coefficient 𝛼  is again 0.600 with real payment and 0.633 
under hypothetical payment in the WST. In the BST these values are 0.619 and 0.658 
respectively. All these results are very similar to those under EUT. Regarding the 
estimates of the probability weighting parameter 𝛾, we obtain a value of 0.647 with real 
payment and 0.678 with hypothetical payment for the WST. This difference is 
significant and indicates that the overweighting (underweighting) of small (large) 
probabilities is more pronounced under real payment. We can observe these effects in 
Figure 3. 
 
In the BST we obtain equivalent results, estimated 𝛾 being 0.638 under real payment 
and 0.681 under hypothetical payment (see Figure 4).  
 
Result 4: Overweighting (underweighting) of small (large) probabilities is greater 
under real payment. 
 
There are no significant differences between WST and BST, neither in 𝛼 nor in 𝛾, 
showing the robustness of the result. To our knowledge, this is the first paper showing 
that probability weighting is affected depending on whether real or hypothetical rewards 
are used4.  
 
 
4 – CONCLUSION 
 
We have analyzed the existence, direction and practical relevance of the difference 
between risk aversion levels inferred under hypothetical and real incentives. Measuring 
individuals’ risk aversion can prove very useful in order to interpret the decisions they 
take under financial risks. Different tests have been developed both in the psychological 
and in the economic literature to this aim. We present results based on Sabater-Grande 
and Georgantzís (2002) multi-lottery choice tests of risk attitude. In contrast to previous 
studies we obtain that when incentives are real subjects are less risk averse than when 
they are hypothetical. 
 
Apart from explaining the characteristics of the test, we show that the way in which it is 
applied is also crucial. If incentives are hypothetical, the answers are noisier, less 
sensitive to changes in the stakes at play, and show a greater level of risk aversion than 
if subjects are monetarily motivated. The SGG test we use has good properties allowing 
us to efficiently obtain two parameters of the utility function of the agent using Rank 
Dependent Utility Theory. The estimated value of the utility weighting parameter 𝛼 is 
significantly lower under real than under hypothetical payments. This means that our 
subjects are less risk-averse under real incentives and the estimated value for 𝛼 (around 
0.60 for real payment) is in line with the values obtained by Harrison et al. (2009) in 
different studies with other samples. We also obtain differences for the estimated value 
of 𝛾, the probability weighting parameter in RDUT, this being also significantly lower 
under real payments. The estimated value of  𝛾 (close to 0.64 for real payment) implies 
the typical overweighting of the small probabilities and underweighting of large 
probabilities by our subjects.  
 
4 Using a between subjects design, Harrison et al. (2010) do not find any significant hypothetical bias for 




We obtain these results from a sample of subjects larger than any other comparable 
study and we use a double design: both within and between-subjects treatments were 
implemented so that the smaller within-subjects treatment served as robustness check of 







APPENDIX: TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
p X €  p X €  p X €  p X €  
1 1  1 1  1 1  1 1  
0,9 1,12  0,9 1,2  0,9 1,67  0,9 2,20  
0,8 1,27  0,8 1,50  0,8 2,50  0,8 3,80  
0,7 1,47  0,7 1,90  0,7 3,57  0,7 5,70  
0,6 1,73  0,6 2,30  0,6 5  0,6 8,30  
0,5 2,10  0,5 3  0,5 7  0,5 12  
0,4 2,65  0,4 4  0,4 10  0,4 17,50  
0,3 3,57  0,3 5,70  0,3 15  0,3 26,70  
0,2 5,40  0,2 9  0,2 25  0,2 45  
0,1 10,90  0,1 19  0,1 55  0,1 100  
PANEL 1 PANEL 2 PANEL 3 PANEL 4 
Table 1: Lottery probabilities (p) and payoffs (X€) 
 
 




Panel 1 384 0.5765625 0.6 0.2778557 
Panel 2 384 0.5171875 0.5 0.2387225 
Panel 3 384 0.5106771 0.5 0.2300314 
Panel 4 384 0.475 0.5 0.2504304 
Mean 384 0.5198568 0.525 0.205881 
Real 
Panel 1 311 0.3710611  0.4 0.2143223 
Panel 2 311 0.3977492  0.4 0.1695195 
Panel 3 311 0.4241158  0.4 0 .156258 
Panel 4 311 0.4041801  0.4 0.1596828 




Panel 1 91 0.5043956 0.5 0.2699432 
Panel 2 91 0.4934066 0.5 0.1878547 
Panel 3 91 0.4857143 0.5 0.1524405 
Panel 4 91 0.443956 0.5 0.2061331 
Mean 91 0.4818681 0.475 0.1437139 
Real 
Panel 1 91 0.378022 0.3 0.235609 
Panel 2 91 0.4065934 0.4 0.1678638 
Panel 3 91 0.4461539 0.4 0.1249957 
Panel 4 91 0.4175824 0.4 0.1487678 
Mean 91 0.4120879 0.4 0.1307756 























e2p,t 384 0.008006 0.082972 
e3p,t 384 0.051577 0.293277 
e4p,t 384 -0.018736 0.501755 
emaxp,t 384 0.000805 0.010033 
Real 
e2p,t 311 0.355647 0.086257 
e3p,t 311 0.059369 0.184351 
e4p,t 311 0.050741 0.553799 




e2p,t 91 0.259637 0.090199 
e3p,t 91 0.031768 0.114136 
e4p,t 91 -0.003048 1.040799 
emaxp,t 91 0.003562 0.013559 
Real 
e2p,t 91 0.035246 0.078817 
e3p,t 91 0.059584 0.127365 
e4p,t 91 -0.015371 0.329843 
emaxp,t 91 0.005880 0.011435 









Probability P-value Elasticity P-value 
 
BST 
Panel 1 0.000 (+) e2 0.0000 (-) 
Panel P2 0.000 (+) e3 0.0003 (-) 
Panel P3 0.000 (+) e4 0.2861 (=) 
Panel P4 0.000 (+) emax 0.0000 (-) 
 
WST 
Panel P1 0.001 (+) e2 0.1834 (=) 
Panel P2 0.003 (+) e3 0.1413 (=) 
Panel P3 0.0158 (+) e4 0.0933 (=) 
Panel P4 0.9730 (=) emax 0.0319 (-) 
Table 4: P-values corresponding to Mann Withney (BST) and Wilcoxon test (WST) 
HR: hypothetical rewards; RR: real rewards; (+) indicates HR>RR; (-) indicates HR<RR; (=) indicates 









Panel Probability Elasticity 
 
BST 
P1 0.0000 (+) 0.0049 (-) 
P2 0.0000 (+) 0.3038 (=) 
P3 0.0000 (+) 0.0245 (-) 
P4 0.0000 (+) 0.0005 (-) 
 
WST 
P1 0.1498 (=) 0.8959 (=) 
P2 0.6881 (=) 0.3729 (=) 
P3 0.4984 (=) 0.1799 (=) 
P4 0.0039 (+) 0.5704 (=) 
Table 5: P-values corresponding to Robust test for equality of variance (Levene test) 
HR: hypothetical rewards; RR: real rewards; (+) indicates HR>RR; (-) indicates HR<RR; (=) indicates 









Panel Probability Elasticity 
 
BST 
P1 0.000 (≠) 0.000 (≠) 
P2 0.000 (≠) 0.000 (≠) 
P3 0.000 (≠) 0.033 (≠) 
P4 0.000 (≠) 0.000 (≠) 
 
WST 
P1 0.001 (≠) 0.345 (=) 
P2 0.010 (≠) 0.255 (=) 
P3 0.130 (=) 0.453 (=) 
P4 0.578 (=) 0.017 (≠) 
Table 6:  P-values corresponding to Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 




WST Expected utility Rank-Dependent utility 
  Coefficient Std. Errors Coefficient Std. Errors 
α Real .6004834 .0100422*** .6002101 .0095474*** 
 Hypothetical .6390580 .0108721*** .6341118 .0104128*** 
γ Real   .6477575 .0096938*** 
 Hypothetical   .6784579 .0144159*** 
 𝐻0:  𝛼𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 = 𝛼𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙      p-value= 0.003                    p-value= 0.006 
𝐻0:  γ𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 = γ𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙                                            p-value= 0.028 
  
BST Expected utility Rank-Dependent utility 
  Coefficient Std. Errors Coefficient Std. Errors 
α Real .6213423 .0049761*** .6194322 .0047398*** 
 Hypothetical .6654572 .0048251***  .6585140    .0045997*** 
γ Real   .6389014 .0053369*** 
 Hypothetical   .6813902 .0095887 *** 
 𝐻0:  𝛼𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 = 𝛼𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙   p-value= 0.000                            p-value= 0.000 
 𝐻0:  γ𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 = γ𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙                                               p-value=0.000 
 (***)significant at 1% confidence level 
 









Figure 1:  Between subjects: Histograms of subjects’ probability choices by panel. 
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